


*CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL 1995*

ER: 62-377/a

STAT



L&E file

Honorable Teodoro Moscoso, Assistant
Administrator for Latin America
Department of State
Agency for International Development
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moscoso:

Mr. McCone has asked me to acknowledge and thank you
for your letter of 16 January enclosing the materials
furnished you by [redacted]

STAT

Mr. McCone has asked some of our specialists here
to study these proposals and he will be in further touch
with you regarding this subject.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[redacted]
Executive Officer

STAT

STAT O/DCI/[redacted] 18 Jan 62


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ER 61-9864/a

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JAN 1962

✓ *[Signature]*

Mr. Howard Furnas
Deputy Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Atomic Energy and Outer Space
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Furnas:

Attached are this Agency's comments on the draft of a proposed approach to the problem of dealing with Soviet anti-missile capability claims which you referred to us on 22 December 1961.

Sincerely,

[Signature] G. P. CABELL

G. P. Cabell
General, USAF
Deputy Director

Attachment

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee w/atts

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GENERAL COMMENTS

As the paper implies, it is noteworthy that the Soviet Union has not yet developed a stronger propaganda campaign on the subject of anti-missile capabilities. There may be certain definite considerations restraining the Soviets from making false claims. If the Soviet Union should claim to be invulnerable, there would be great pressure from Peiping and other quarters for a more aggressive policy. If the Soviet claim were actually false, Moscow might be forced either to back down or go through with a nuclear war. Moscow may also hesitate to make false claims out of respect for our monitoring system. Further, there might just possibly be a belief that loud claims of an approaching Soviet invulnerability that would make Western leaders, especially military, behave irrationally and launch a preventive war in a last futile effort to postpone the death of capitalism. We might point out that, although the first American reaction to any Soviet claim to prowess is usually disbelief, serious, explicit Soviet claims in such fields as rockets and nuclear weapons have generally proved to have some foundation. Thus a major Soviet campaign on anti-missile capability may well, when it comes, betoken a genuine capability of considerable dimensions, although not necessarily adequate to offset a U.S. attack. As matters stand, Malinovsky's statement (as you have noted) implies a potential, not current capability. General Kazakov (see FBIS RS. 49, p. 16) speaks vaguely of land, sea, and air targets. Khrushchev, who is notoriously bullish and who is sometimes unguarded in his statements, appears to have been jumping the gun in his talk with Spaak; his reply to Sulzberger's question was evasive, and claimed only satisfaction with the work going on. General Kuleshov's embroidery on Malinovsky (RS. 49, p. 16) is most ominous, though it offers no evidence.

Despite the foregoing, a false campaign on anti-missile strength is definitely a possibility (perhaps at the next intensification of the Berlin crisis). Rather than make an immediate assertion of a general capability, the Soviet government will probably publish a cumulative series of Khrushchevian assertions, reports of successes, and rumors of startling accomplishments. And there is also an eventual real capability to reckon with. The latter would of course have immense psychological significance, for it would not only encourage warlike Soviet policies, but also--more than false claims, which we could more or less readily contest--tend to divide NATO and to weaken the American will to resist. We think your draft paper offers a sound program for dealing with the over-all problem, but we offer the specific comments which follow.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

Page 4, para. 1: We agree that the treatment of Soviet capabilities should be in a low key, and in fact we feel that there may be a danger, after as well as before the Soviet campaign begins, of "protesting too much" on our ability to outmatch Soviet defenses, thus drawing attention to Soviet claims. But we should seize the opportunity, before the Soviet campaign begins, to stress our own anti-missile program, and the U. S. offensive capability, including a wide range of weapons, thus creating public awareness before our information campaign appears a mere response to Soviet claims. We can also draw on some Soviet statements. (see RS. 49, p. 15).

Page 5, para. 3a: We must expect the Soviets also to produce photographs, as well as "eye-witness reports," damaged missiles which have been "shot down," and so forth. Again, it would be desirable to get our evidence fully in the public eye before the Soviets begin presenting theirs.

Pages 6 and 7, para. 4a: Supersonic aircraft, aircraft with air-to-surface missiles, and Polaris underwater-launched missiles would seem to be the most convincing weapons to stress.

Page 7, para. 4b: Historical precedents appear only slightly convincing under the projected conditions. Moreover, in World War I, defense had the advantage. Instead, we might argue that, in the nuclear age, the offensive has an unprecedented advantage over the defense.

Page 7, para. 4d, last sentence: Once these developments have reached a point where the United States can present a convincing claim to capability, security hesitations should be reviewed in the light of (a) probable Soviet knowledge, and (b) the extreme importance of assuring free world publics that we have an effective deterrent. In other words, while avoiding needless disclosures, and revelations which will assist the Soviets in developing counter-measures, we should remember that the policy aim of maintaining a convincing deterrent has priority over security for security's sake. This comment also applies to the first paragraph of p. 8.

Page 9, paras. 3 and 4: We would be prepared to try to identify types of demonstrations the Soviet Union might give. Then we would also be ready to call attention to doubtful aspects of Soviet claims.

Pages 9 and 10, para. 5c: This would be very good, if we were confident of success. Failure would be so serious that this action seems ruled out.

Page 10, para. 6: Agree.



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

21-9864

December 22, 1961

~~SECRET~~

Dear General Cabell:

Attached is a draft of a proposed approach to the problem of dealing with Soviet anti-missile capability claims. Will you please send me any comments or suggested revisions you may have, especially in the light of the technical briefing we received the other day in the meeting with Mr. [redacted]

25X1

It is my feeling that we should not now attempt to outline detailed steps for use in case of Soviet actions, but that we should agree on a statement of basic principles to govern activities which individual agencies will need to undertake. The agencies should, of course, begin as soon as possible to prepare for measures in their respective fields, and an agreed contingency plan will provide the necessary guidance for such preparations.

When I have received your comments and suggestions, we can consider the question of the next meeting of the group.

Sincerely yours,

Howard Furnas
Deputy

Attachment.

General Charles P. Cabell,
Deputy Director,
Central Intelligence Agency.

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Susanna —

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CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	

Remarks:

For preparation of reply for my signature

in coordination with AD/SI.

(following handwritten note added by DDCI:
"My general comment is that we must avoid an implication that "we protest too much". CPC Ltr of 12/22/61 to DDCI from Mr. Howard Furnas, Special Asst. to the Secretary of State transmitting for comment draft of anti-missile capability.

(via ER to log, take care of receipt and hand carry)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER		
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